Unconditionally secure communication, being pursued for thousands of years, however, hasn't been reached yet due to continuous competitions between encryption and hacking. Quantum key distribution (QKD), harnessing the quantum mechanical nature of superposition and non-cloning, may promise unconditional security by incorporating the one-time pad algorithm rigorously proved by Claude Shannon. Massive efforts have been made in building practical and commercial QKD systems, in particular, decoy states are employed to detect photon-number splitting attack against single-photon source loophole, and measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD has further closed all loopholes in detection side, which leads to a seemingly real-life application. Here, we propose and experimentally demonstrate an MDI-QKD hacking strategy on the trusted source assumption by using injection locking technique. Eve injects near off-resonance photons in randomly chosen polarization into sender's laser, where injection locking in a shifted frequency can happen only when Eve's choice matches with sender's state. By setting a shifted window and switching the frequency of photons back afterwards, Eve in principle can obtain all the keys without terminating the real-time QKD. We observe the dynamics of a semiconductor laser with injected photons, and obtain a hacking success rate reaching 60.0%. Our results suggest that the spear-and-shield competitions on unconditional security may continue until all potential loopholes are discovered and closed ultimately.
geting at imperfections of certain devices in actual QKD implementations.
Enormous efforts have been made in developing hacking and its countermeasures aiming to improve security of QKD. Apart from few source-side attacks like phase information attack [5] that emphasizes the significance of phase randomization condition, most of attackers target at the physical loopholes at detection side, which is the most vulnerable part in QKD setups, such as time shift [6] [7] [8] , time information [9] , detector control [10] [11] [12] , detector dead time [13] and channel calibration [14] attacks. A straightforward way to resist those attackers is to add corresponding countermeasures into QKD systems for each certain loophole [15, 16] . For instance, decoy-state protocol [17] [18] [19] , marked as a milestone towards practical QKD, utilizes different intensities to detect photon-number splitting attack, allowing the same security level as perfect single-photon source scenarios.
DI-QKD [20] [21] [22] is proposed to waive all the assumptions of trusted parties, either detection or source side, whereas it requires a detection efficiency higher than 80%. While DI-QKD can close all the physical loopholes, its stringent requirement on detection efficiency is extremely challenging and remains to be met, limiting its application in ambient conditions due to the short achievable channel and the requirement of near-unit-efficiency detection. MDI-QKD is developed to close all potential detection-side loopholes, and most importantly its implementation is within current technology, meanwhile its key rate and achievable channel remain acceptable [23] . MDI-QKD, together with decoy-state protocol, has closed all most all the known attacks on the remaining physical loopholes, and therefore provides a practically feasible and seemingly sufficient security.
Here, we show that it is still possible to attack a mature MDI-QKD system by conceiving a novel scheme and exploiting a new device loophole in source side. We demonstrate that Eve can control Alice's source by forcing her laser resonant at a designed frequency. We analyze and experimentally observe the injection-locking dynamics of a semiconductor laser, and obtain a hacking success rate of 60.0% and error rate of 6.1%, with appropriate injection power 110 nW. To test the robustness of hacking scheme in practice, a series of countermeasures made by Alice are conducted by adding 1dB and 3dB isolation, which leads to the slight declines of success rate to 44.0% and 36.1% respectively, still considerably high informa-FIG. 1. Sketch of injection locking strategy hacking an MDI-QKD system. At Alice's station, the WCP source is realized by a high photon-flux laser and isolators. The wavelength of Alice's laser is 852.355nm, while that of Eve's laser is detuned by 251MHz. Eve inserts a beamsplitter into the communication channel, and injects pulses with four randomly coded polarization states into Alice's site. A Fabry-Perot cavity serves as a spectrum filter to block unwanted photons, and an acoustic optical modulator (AOM) is utilized to shift frequency back to Alice's, and also works as a temporal filter. The complete set of polarization-matching situations of Alice and Eve is shown as the insert. For the matched cases, Alice's laser is frequency shifted well and become very distinct from the unmatched cases, and therefore can be selected by the cavity filter to form an effective information leakage. The dashed lines is for eye guiding to indicate the frequency of encoded photons from Alice at different stages.
tion leakage. Furthermore, Alice's isolation can be eliminated by increasing the injection laser power. Given the assumption that Eve has unlimited capabilities as long as being subject to quantum mechanics, for example infinite laser power, she can always hack MDI-QKD systems with constantly high success rate.
As is shown in Figure 1 , Alice and Bob prepare weak coherent pulses (WCPs) in four BB84 polarization states, and send them to an untrusted relay to perform a Bell state measurement as a typically MDI-QKD does [23] . To demonstrate the hacking strategy, Eve (known as master laser) injects a beam of near off-resonance pulse with 
four randomly chosen polarization states into Alice's laser (known as slave laser) backward. From the inset of Figure  1 , we can see that injection locking in a shifted frequency can happen only when Eve's choice matches with Alice's state. By setting a shifted window via a frequency filter, Eve maximizes the transmittance for the photons in the matched cases, with which Eve in principle can obtain all the keys. It should be noticed that the frequency of transmitted photons can be converted back, before being sent to measurement and interfered with Bob's photons, thus the whole hacking process doesn't terminate the real-time QKD. The detuned pulses from Eve's master laser are prepared in four polarization states randomly. Alice's slave laser, a semiconductor laser in a wavelength of 852.355nm near cesium D2 line, can be in the stage of either stable locking or nonlinear process, when it is externally injected with monochromatic photons under various injection-power levels [25] . In the nonlinear regime, many frequency components are generated, and multimode competition appears. With the increase of injected photons, the frequency of the slave laser approaches that of master's completely when the injection power exceeds the stable locking threshold. A Fabry-Perot cavity that only resonant with the frequency of the master laser can serve as a spectrum filter to block unlocked photons and pick out the matched events. The following acoustic optical modulator can serve as frequency shifter as well as a temporal filter, which further contribute to block un- wanted photons.
A hacking event is considered as successful if Eve chooses the same bases with Alice: let the same polarized photons pass through the cavity filter, while block orthogonally polarized photons. Afterwards, Eve monitors Alice and Bob's post-selection results, as in BB84 protocol, and keeps the data where they use the same bases and discards the rest according to Table I . Moreover, once a quantum communication process is completed, Eve applies the same operation with Alice according to the announced measurement results (typically see Table I in reference [23] ), to guarantee that she possesses the right bit streams as well as Alice's and Bob's.
In order to increase hacking success rate and decrease error rate, the injection power must be strong enough to lock slave laser, and simultaneously half of this power should be too weak to do so. As is shown in Figure  2 , we simulate the dynamics of a single-mode semiconductor laser with injected photons theoretically, and obtain the intensity of output photons by numerical simulation and spectrum analysis, see Supplementary Information for more details. We further experimentally demonstrate this dynamics process by setting a series of injection power and recording counts of output photons after the cavity filter, as the square points presented in Figure 2 , which follow our theoretical simulation very well. With such a test, we can clearly see the nonlinear regime and locking regime, and more importantly it identifies a transition point. The pulses that match with Alice's polarization should have enough power to enable injection locking, and all other pulses are in the nonlinear regime. Apparently, the sharper the transition is, the higher success rate and lower error rate we can achieve in the hacking process.
Based on the characterized dynamical behavior of Alice's laser shown in Figure 2 , we set the injection power at 110 nW, slightly stronger than the transition point to demonstrate a typical hacking performance. The measured photon flux transmitted through the cavity filter at all possible combinations of Eve's and Alice's polarization states are shown as a three dimensional histogram and its top view (see Figure 3a and the inset). Light blue columns represent transmitted photons in the case of that Alice and Eve choose the different bases, and therefore will be discarded after a standard post-selection in QKD. Red and dark blue columns represent transmitted photons when Alice and Eve choose the same bases, which will be kept. In particular, the red parts are correcthacked keys, and dark blue parts represents error.
Defining the eavesdropping success rate as the ratio of the amount of kept data and total incidents, and the eavesdropping error rate as the proportion of mistakes in kept data. The successful rate measured at 110 nW injection power reaches 60.0%, and the error rate is 6.1%. The error mainly comes from the failure of blocking un- wanted photons, due to the fact that the injection locking can not be ceased completely in the nonlinear regime. Few errors come from the fluorescent nooise of the slave laser, the scattering on the beam splitter, and also the limited extinction rate of the cavity filter. Pulse shapes of transmitted photons in three injection levels are illustrated as Figure 3b . We can clearly see that the intensity obtained in locking regime is much stronger than that in nonlinear regime.
A very straightforward countermeasure strategy that we can think of against the hacking strategy is to add more isolation to block Eve's injection. We realize this by adding 1dB and 3dB loss while increasing the laser power in Alice's station as a compensation. As is shown in Figure 4 and also in Table II , we do observe a decline of the hacking success rate slightly from 60.0% to 44.0% and 36.1%, and an increase of the hacking error rate from 6.1% to 10.0% and 15.4%, respectively. Keeping other conditions unchanged, we can see that while the isolation countermeasure strategy can lower the hacking success rate and raise the error rate, unfortunately, still considerable part of keys are hacked successfully. Furthermore, Alice's isolation can be eliminated by increasing the injection laser power, which leads to a new transition point. Given the assumption that Eve has unlimited capabilities as long as being subject to quantum mechanics, for example infinite laser power, she can always hack MDI-QKD systems with constantly high success rate.
More experimental results under different conditions are summarized in Table II . Hacking performance of WCP sources under four different injection power situations indicates the optimal hacking power and the robustness of the hacking strategy. The additional experiment for hacking high photon flux source raises the amount of signal while keeps noise constant, which means signal-tonoise ratio is increased. The outcome reveals the negative influence of noise in our implementations, which can be improved by further reducing the scattering on the beam splitter and narrowing the window of the temporal filter.
In summary, we propose and demonstrate an MDI-QKD hacking strategy on the trusted source assumption by using injection locking technique, with a success rate approaching 60.0% and an error rate as low as 6.1%. We also propose and demonstrate an isola-tion countermeasure strategy to test the robustness of the injection locking strategy. While the performance of the hacking strategy degrades, unfortunately, still significant amounts of keys are eavesdropped without being detected. Even worse, unconditional security of QKD is under the assumption that Eve has the power only subjected to quantum mechanics, apparently with infinite laser power, Eve will always be able to hack MDI-QKD systems even with the isolation protection.
A sufficient security is possible if Alice added many order more isolation, since Eve cannot possess infinite laser power in practice. Of course, the whole system of MDI-QKD will have to become more complicated and expensive. However, the main message we would like to deliver here is that there may exist many other physical loopholes remaining undiscovered when we believe that MDI-QKD has already been a very mature and commercially available solution. Our results suggest that the spear-and-shield competitions on unconditionally secure communication may continue, and hacking strategies, though their anti-hacking solutions may be readily available, should be enthusiastically pursued to discover and close all potential loopholes for genuinely unconditional security. Here we present theoretical details of the dynamics of a single-mode semiconductor laser with external injection. When the slave laser injected with increasingly stronger external photon flux, it transforms from nonlinear regime to locking regime under weak injection situations, and after a complex intermediate region, it ends at a strong injection locking regime [1] . Here we just simulate weak injection situations needed in our experiment.
The external injection process is described by adding a forcing term to the Lang-Kobayashi model [2] :
where E(t) represents the total changeable electric field; E x is the amplitude of injected photons, and ν is the difference of frequency between injected and original photons. Note that all electric fields mentioned here are normalized so that the square of their amplitudes give the corresponding photon numbers in laser cavity. δN (t) represents the difference of carrier numbers between actual and original situations; κ is the fees-in rate (reciprocal value of round-trip-time in laser cavity); P 0 stands for the number of original photons. Others are the parameters of the semiconductor laser, as is shown in Table I . When injected with external photon flux, the variance of electric filed can be simulated by numerically integrating equations (1) and (2), and after applying Fourier transform, the amplitude of injection-amplified laser is calculated. Since what we concerned here is the power of the laser with a certain frequency, the relation between output power (P power ) and photon number in laser cavity (P ) is described as [3] :
FIG. S1 demonstrates the varying electric field, amplitude and spectrum results with E x =0.3 (a), 1.2 (b), 1.7 (c). The initial state in simulation is set to the original state of the slave laser, and thus it takes several nanoseconds to evolve. So we use the later part for Fourier analysis, which is circled in Figure1. 
